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The Paris Agreement is the leading international treaty on the global commitment 
to combat climate change. Canada ratified the treaty in 2016 and voiced its commitment 
to implementing climate change policies at all levels of government.1 The Paris 
Agreement seeks to hold global temperature rise to 2°C while pursuing efforts to limit 
this increase to 1.5°C.2 Article 4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a binding 
commitment on all Parties to maintain a nationally determined contribution (NDC) and to 
pursue domestic measures to achieve these goals through reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.3 How these measures are achieved is left to the individual country, as 
the Paris Agreement is silent on this aspect.  
 In the Canadian context, the question becomes what Canada is doing to achieve 
its emission reduction target. Canada has pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 30 
percent below 2005 levels before 2030 as its NDC.4 Ultimately, the goal is to reach net-
zero emissions before 2050.5 However, this is a non-binding commitment. This paper 
asks whether there is an additional obligation – beyond the Paris Agreement - under 
international law requiring Canada to reduce its emissions. It argues that the answer is 
yes: there is customary international law (CIL) requiring states to prevent transboundary 
 
1 Sean Grassie, “Canada and the Global Pact for the environment: A Strategic Analysis” (2019) 32:2 J 
Enviro L & Prac 207 at 237.  
2 Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, No. 54113 (entered into force 4 November 2016) at Art 2(a) 
[hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
3 Ibid, at Art 4. 
4 “Progress towards Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction target,” Government of Canada, online: 
< https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/progress-
towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-target.html>.  






harm and therefore from engaging in activities which would cause significant cross-
border damage. This CIL norm also compels Canada to prevent persons or entities within 
its jurisdiction from carrying out such activities.6 While this CIL is referred to by a 
number of terms– such as the no-harm principle and the obligation to prevent 
transfrontier pollution – this paper refers to the norm as the duty to prevent transboundary 
harm or the duty of prevention. Under this CIL norm, Canada is obligated to prevent 
GHG emissions from flowing cross-boundary and causing harm in other countries.  
This paper is organized into five parts. The first part of this paper defines the 
components of CIL: state practice and opinio juris. When these two thresholds are met, a 
customary duty becomes binding on all states. The second part of this paper identifies the 
duty to prevent transboundary harm as a CIL. The duty was first defined in the 1941 Trail 
Smelter case.7 Since Trail Smelter, a number of cases brought before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and treaties have dealt with the duty of prevention. The ICJ has 
even explicitly identified the duty as a CIL. The third section evaluates the contours of 
the duty, which must be understood by asking what the requirements are of a state to 
reduce its emissions. A state must make a due diligent effort to prevent the harm from 
occurring. Furthermore, this harm must also be a “significant risk.” The fourth part 
argues that the duty of prevention applies in the context of climate change. Climate 
change clearly is a “significant risk” and states, while not required to cease an activity 
altogether, are required to take active steps to reduce their emissions. Finally, this paper 
 
6 Florentina Simlinger & Benoit Mayer, “Legal Responses to Climate Change Induced Loss and Damage” 
in Reinhard Mehcler, Laurens M. Bouwer, Thomas Schinko, Swenja Surminski & JoAnne Linnerooth-
Bayer, eds, Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options (Cham: 
Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019) at 187 [hereinafter Simlinger & Mayer]. 
7 Trail Smelter Case (United States, Canada), [11 March 1941] IJC (International Joint Commission) at 




seeks to identify whether Canada is obligated to reduce its GHG emission under CIL. 
Canada follows a modified monist approach to CIL, meaning that, unless domestic 
legislation displaces the CIL, it must be respected. This paper argues that Canada has a 
clear duty under international law to prevent transboundary harm by reducing its 
emissions, that this duty amounts to CIL, and therefore this duty flows directly into 
Canada’s domestic law. It also argues that there is no domestic legislation that displaces 
this CIL; rather, the recently enacted Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, which has 
been upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), reinforces that 
CIL. In other words, in addition to abiding by its obligation to reduce GHG emissions 
under the Paris Agreement, Canada is obligated to reduce its emissions based on this 
CIL. 
2. Customary International Law 
 
CIL is an unwritten law binding on all countries and which cannot be altered by 
any particular state.8 To become custom, a particular international rule or principle must 
meet a two-part test. The first part of the test requires state practice, while the second part 
requires acceptance of this practice as law, or opinio juris.9  This test has been widely 
accepted by states, judicial decisions, international institutions, and scholars.10 CIL is 
reflected in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which 
 
8 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
at 6 [hereinafter Brownlie].  
9 UN ILC, Draft conclusion in identification of customary international law, with commentaries, seventieth 
session, A/73/10 (2018) at 122-123 (hereinafter UN Draft CIL).  
10 Niels Peterson, “The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Poltiics of Identifying Customary 
International Law,”(2017) 28:2 EJIL 357; Michael Wood UN ILC, Second report on identification of 
customary international law, sixty-sixth session, A/CN.4/672 (2014) International Law Commission 




provides that “[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply … (b) international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted by law.”11 However, difficulties arise when it 
comes to discerning both general practice and acceptance of law, since states often do not 
practice a particular usage because they feel legally compelled to do so. 
a. State practice 
 
 State practice is the practice by states of a particular rule or principle.12 It has 
three elements: duration, generality, and uniformity.13 Duration is simple: while no 
particular duration is required, the continued practice of a usage over time will be a part 
of the evidence of generality.14 Even so, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ 
held that the passage of a considerable period of time was unnecessary to form customary 
law.15 This implies that a court has discretion when determining whether a particular 
principle has become CIL. 
Generality refers to the widespread nature of the practice: the principle must be 
recognized by most, but not all nations.16 In order to determine generality, courts will 
 
11 Statute of The International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946 at Art. 38; It should be noted that the terms 
‘custom’ and ‘usage’ are often used interchangeably; however, these terms have different menaings. A 
usage is a general practice that does not reflect a legal obligation, while in contrast, a legal obligation is 
essential for a custom. Therefore, to become a custom, it must be shown that there is a belief that a 
particular practice is law: Brownlie, supra note 8 at 7. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, at 7.  
14 Ibid, at 7.  
15 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) “Reports of Judgment, Advisory Opinions and Orders” (20 February 1969) ICJ 
Reports No 327 at 43 [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf] 
16 Justice Louis Lebel, “A Common Law of the World? The Reception of Customary International Law in 
The Canadian Common Law” (2014) 65:3 UNBLJ at 5 [hereinafter Lebel J.]; There is still little consensus 
over what “general” entails: Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Guide to International Law in (Kininklijke 




examine the number or distribution of states following the relevant practice.17 The 
practice of states whose interests are specifically affected are given more weight.18 The 
International Law Association (ILA) has indicated that, if “participation is sufficiently 
representative, it is not normally necessary for even a majority of States to have engaged 
in the practice, provided that there is no significant dissent.”19 The real problem in 
determining generality is to discern the value of abstention from protest by a substantial 
number of states concerning a practice that other states follow.20 If a state is silent on the 
issue, it may denote a tacit agreement or a simple lack of interest on the issue.21 It will be 
up to the tribunal to decide whether abstention from protest or silence is because states 
are practicing the particular custom.  
The third requirement, of uniformity, means that the relevant practice must be 
consistent amongst states.22 While complete uniformity is not required, substantial 
uniformity is required.23 This is especially true when there are particularly affected states: 
the practice of the most affected states should be extensive.24 However, some 
inconsistency is not fatal.25 To illustrate how some inconsistent practice is not a detriment 
to a custom, the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction stressed that “too much importance need 
not be attached to the few uncertainties or contradictions” when considering uniformity in 
 
17 Wood, supra note 10 at 37. 
18 Ibid. 
19 International Law Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law 
(London Conference: 2000) at 25 I [hereinafter ILA Conference].  
20 Brownlie, supra note 8 at 7-8. 
21 Ibid, at 8. 
22 ILA Conference, supra note 19 at 42.  
23 Brownlie, supra note 8 at 7. 
24 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 15 at 43.  




state practice.26 Thus, one particular state failing to follow or acknowledge a particular 
usage is not detrimental to that usage reaching customary status. 
In sum: 1) no particular duration is required, but the passage of time is evidence 
of generality; 2) the practice must be generally recognized by most, but not necessarily 
all, nations; and 3) state practice must be found consistently (particularly among the most 
affected states), but it need not be absolute. These three elements - duration, generality, 
and uniformity - are the essential ingredients of state practice. 
To determine state practice, a tribunal can look to a wide variety of sources. 
Examples include physical and verbal acts by stated officials, state conduct in connection 
with treaties, resolutions adopted by international organizations, legislative and 
administrative acts, and decisions by national courts.27 It is usually not practical for any 
court to determine the practice of almost 200 nations.28 Discerning state practice from 
every state has been described as a “Herculean” task.29 Therefore, courts will usually 
examine only a representative sample of states.30 Once a court determines a particular 
usage among this sample, the court will balance inconsistent state practice with the 
observed patterns of other states.31 This balancing exercise will depend on the duration, 
generality, and uniformity. Once weighed against each other, a court may then decide 
whether the usage is sufficient to reach the state practice threshold. 
b. Opinio juris 
 
 
26 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom vs Norway), “Judgment” (18 December 1951) ICJ Reports No 
116 at 136. 
27 Note this list is non-exhaustive: Wood, supra note 10 at 37. 
28 Stefan A.G. Talmon, “Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between 
Induction, Deduction and Assertion” (2015) 26:2 EJIL 417 at 432 [hereinafter Talmon]. 
29 Richard Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 105. 
30 Talmon, supra note 28 at 432.  




 CIL depends not only on state practice (that is, on observable regularities of 
behaviour), but also on acceptance of these regularities as law by states.32 This is called 
opinio juris, which is the psychological or subjective element of CIL. The ICJ defined 
opinio juris in the North Sea Continental Shelf case: “[n]ot only must the acts concerned 
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, 
as to constitute evidence of a belief by the state parties that a practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”33 States must act from a sense of 
legal obligation, rather than being motivated by courtesy, fairness, or morality.34 In other 
words, a state must feel compelled to follow the practice stemming from a legal 
obligation, and is not simply undertaking the practice out of habit.  
 According to the late Ian Brownlie, the ICJ has taken two different approaches in 
determining whether opinio juris exists. In the first approach, the ICJ is willing to assume 
the existence of opinio juris on the basis of evidence of general practice, a consensus in 
the literature, or in the previous determinations of the court or other international 
tribunals.35 In the second approach, the court has adopted a more rigorous methodology 
calling for more positive evidence of the recognition of the validity of the rules in 
question in the practice of states.36 Examples of such evidence of opinio juris can be 
found in: public statements made on behalf of states, official publications, government 
legal opinions, decisions by national courts, as well as conduct in connection with 
 
32 Jo Lynn Slama, “Opinio Juris in Customary International Law” (1990) 15:2 Ola City U. L. Rev 603 at 
606-607 [hereinafter Slama]; Daniel Bodansky, “Customary (And Not So Customary) International 
Environmental law” (1995) 3:1 Ind J Globla Leg Stud 105 at 109 [hereinafter Bodansky]; Anthony 
D’Amato, “The Theory of Customary International Law” (1988) 82 Am Society Intl’ L 243.  
33 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 15 at 44. 
34 Brownlie, supra note 8 at 8.  





resolutions or treaties.37 The approach taken by the court seems to depend on the 
discretion of the court and the nature of the issue.38 As will be shown later in this essay, 
the ICJ has primarily taken the first approach concerning the duty of prevention. 
Regardless, it is still important to demonstrate how a court takes the more rigorous 
approach, since the rigorous approach is used more often when it may be more difficult to 
show an opinio juris. The fact the ICJ is using the first, less rigorous, approach to 
determine the opinio juris of the duty of prevention implies that the psychological belief 
is more clearly established.  
 The North Sea Continental Shelf Case represents one example of the ICJ 
requiring strict proof of opinio juris. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ 
was asked to determine the boundaries of the area located on the continental shelf 
between Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands.39 The ICJ did not accept that 
equidistance, a legal concept that maritime boundaries should conform to a median line 
that is equidistant from the shores of neighbouring nations, had become CIL on the date 
of the Geneva Convention of 1958 or in relation to subsequent practice.40 The Court 
determined that the equidistance principle established in Article 6 of the Geneva 
Convention of 1958 was not of a norm-creating character.41 In addition, the Convention 
had only been in force for three years when the proceedings were brought and, 
consequently, the state practice was not “extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of 
the provisions invoked; and moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
 
37 Note this list is non-exhaustive: Wood, supra note 10 at 45-70. 
38 Ibid. 
39 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 15. 
40 Ibid. 




recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”42 Therefore, the 
equidistance principle was found not to be part of CIL. 
Similar to state practice, opinio juris does not need to be demonstrated in each 
individual state for a particular usage to form a legal obligation.43 In the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities Case, the court indicated that opinio juris can be determined 
through general opinion or general recognition.44 The word “general” here means “the 
aggregate of many individual opinions”.45 The court used the subjective element as a 
legal view of a specific group of states that were parties to an international convention.46 
This essentially means that opinio juris can be formed by the entire international 
community or by a region of states. What matters is that a state is following a usage out 
of a sense of legal obligation.  
c. Can the ICJ and treaties determine CIL?  
 
Can the ICJ use treaties to determine that certain usage amounts to CIL? As 
previously mentioned, discerning CIL purely from state practice and opinio juris can 
certainly be a “Herculean” task. According to Pierre-Marie Dupuy, when writing in 
international environmental law, scholars often cite the largest number of possible 
opinions, treaties, and recommendations in order to find a particular rule compulsory.47 It 
is often problematic to demonstrate the compulsory character of a norm – in other words, 
 
42 Ibid, at 108-9. 
43 Slama, supra note 32 at 654. 
44 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14 at 98 [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities Case]. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, at 117. 
47 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Formation of Customary International Law General Principles” in Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunée & Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 




to prove that the norm has been integrated into the ‘corpus juris’ of general international 
law – by simply citing a large number of opinions, treaties, and recommendations.48 The 
reason is that other conditions must be met; in particular, mere reiteration of different 
international documents does not actually consider what a particular state believes is 
binding.49 According to Dupuy, the ICJ may satisfy the existence of opinio juris of states 
as long as this belief is confirmed in practice.50 Moreover, the ICJ may rationalize this 
picture of state practice that it perceives in a given area and assert the existence of a 
customary norm in a case.51 However, states rarely seek recourse at the ICJ for 
environmental disputes, and when there is a dispute, the court rarely decides to 
pronounce itself on the specific legal status of the norm in question.52 Furthermore, 
courts are restricted to the specific facts of the case and the specific formulation of the 
legal question by parties to the dispute.53 Therefore, a particular usage becoming a CIL is 
not dependant on the ICJ’s declaration that it has entered the corpus juris of international 
law.  
The question then becomes how much credibility do international courts have in 
stating a particular rule or principle is part of CIL? The Michael Wood report on the ILC 
Draft Articles stated: “While the decisions of international courts and tribunals as to the 
existence of rules of customary international law and their formulation are not ‘practice’, 
such decisions serve an important role as subsidiary means for determination of rules of 
law.”54 Furthermore, the Wood report asserted that the pronouncements of the ICJ may 
 
48 Ibid, at 453. 
49 Ibid, at 458. 
50 Ibid, at 453. 
51 Ibid, at 460. 
52 Ibid, at 453. 
53 Ibid. 




carry great weight.55 Therefore, while decisions by the ICJ do not amount to state 
practice in and of themselves, these decisions can still be determinative as to whether 
something is a rule of CIL.   
The proposition that treaties are representative of CIL has support from the ICJ. In 
the Military and Paramilitary Activities case, the ICJ considered the relationship between 
treaties and custom, finding that multilateral conventions “may have an important role to 
play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing 
them.”56 Furthermore, the ICJ recognized that customary rules may emerge which are 
identical to those of treaty law, and which exist simultaneously with treaty obligations.57 
In the North Sea Continental Case, the ICJ found that state practice since the conclusion 
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, including signature and 
ratification of the convention, could create a CIL.58 The ICJ identified the conditions to 
be fulfilled for a new rule to become a CIL that results from a treaty:  
It would in the first place be necessary that the provision concerned should, at all 
events, potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could 
be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule … with respect to the other 
elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be 
considered to have become a general rule of international law, it might be that, 
even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread 
and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided 




56 Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, supra 44 at 98. 
57 Ibid, at 14. This is the underlying argument of this paper: that Canada has two identical treaty obligations 
to reduce GHG emissions, both of which exist simultaneously: one under the Paris Agreement and one 
under the CIL duty of prevention. This argument is developed in more detail below.  
58 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 15 at 73.  




Furthermore, from the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the court noted that some non-binding resolutions, “may sometimes have 
normative value”, adding: 
…they can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing 
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether 
this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its 
content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an 
opinio juris exists as to its normative character.60 Thus, it should not be assumed 
that the mere fact a large number of states being a Party to a treaty establishes a 
customary norm for all.61  
Therefore, essential to whether a treaty can be a CIL is whether there is a “normative 
character” or of a “fundamentally norm-creating character”. 
 Establishing a CIL necessitates the finding of state practice and opinio juris. But 
the ICJ can determine both and declare a particular usage as a custom. The ICJ making 
this declaration carries great weight. If a treaty has a norm creating character, then this 
can further create a CIL. As this essay will demonstrate, the duty of prevention has 
consistently been brought to the ICJ and even declared as a custom. In addition, there are 
a number of international treaties that have explicitly mentioned that states have a duty to 
prevent a specific harm. This should be ample enough evidence to establish the duty of 
prevention as CIL. 
3. The Duty to Prevent Transboundary Harm as CIL 
 
 This section examines whether the duty to prevent transboundary harm has 
reached the status of CIL. It argues that the answer is yes. This is especially true 
 
60 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep at 226, 245-255 
[hereinafter Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons]. 
61 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




considering that the ICJ has formally stated that the duty is a CIL. Regarding state 
practice, the three necessary elements – duration, generality, uniformity – have all been 
met. Concerning Brownlie’s two part opinio juris analysis, the ICJ has tended to take an 
approach that reflects the less rigid standard when concerning the duty of prevention. The 
ICJ has generally cited prior decision and treaties to determine that the duty of prevention 
has reached customary status.  
a. Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel 
 
Prior to the 1941 Trail Smelter case, there was very little evidence of 
environmental policies or cases dealing with pollutants flowing across boundaries. Since 
Trail Smelter, a number of treaties and cases have identified the duty to prevent 
transboundary harm as international law, some even as a norm of CIL. The question 
before the court in Trail Smelter was what level of continuing relief a source state of 
pollution owes to the affected state.62 This was framed as a question of law to be 
ascertained by looking at the nature of the duty of relief.63 To accomplish this task, the 
court looked for the content of the international law “rule”, which was assumed to be a 
general principle applicable to all transboundary pollution at all times and places.64 In 
Trail Smelter, Canada was judged liable for the damages caused by pollutants discharged 
into the atmosphere by a smelter in British Columbia and then carried by dominant winds 
towards the U.S. state of Washington.65 In Washington, a group of rural farmers claimed 
damages from the waste emitted by the smelter, since this caused injury to plant life, 
 








forest trees, soil and crop yields.66 Notably, this was not an ICJ decision. The case was 
brought forward by the United States and was referred to the International Joint 
Commission, a bilateral Canada-U.S. tribunal tasked with overseeing transborder issues 
such as this regarding the two countries.67 In coming to its decision to hold Canada liable 
for $350,000 in damages to be paid to the farmers,68 the International Joint Commission 
made an important assertion, one which forms the basis of the duty to prevent 
transboundary harm: “[u]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the 
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury to properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”69 In other 
words, a country has a duty at all times to protect other states against injurious acts 
caused by individuals from within its jurisdiction. Since Trail Smelter, a number of 
international declarations and resolutions have supported this norm as an expression of 
universal opinio juris.  
 Following Trail Smelter, the 1949 ICJ’s Corfu Channel case held Albania 
responsible for damaging British warships in the North Corfu Strait.70 The warships had 
sailed through part of Albanian territorial waters, and two of the ships struck water mines, 
causing explosions that killed 44 people.71 The dispute before the court was whether 
Albania was responsible for the explosions and resulting damage and loss of human 
 
66 Ibid, at 1921-23. 
67 Ibid, at 1907. 
68 Ibid, at 1960. 
69 Ibid, at 1960.0 
70 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4 at 
4. 




life.72 In this regard, the court claimed that every state is “under an obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”73 
Much like Trail Smelter, the court did not base the statement on treaty law, but referred to 
“certain general and well-recognized principles.”74 Thus, the ICJ recognized the 
existence of general principles of law prohibiting states from violating the rights of or 
inflicting damage on other states. Following both Corfu Channel and Trail Smelter, the 
ICJ was largely silent for a considerable period of time on the duty to prevent 
transboundary harm. However, a number of international treaties and declarations 
emerged that furthered the development of the duty within CIL. 
b. Principle 21 and 2 and treaty law 
As mentioned earlier, for a treaty to form CIL, it will need to have a 
“fundamentally norm-creating character” or a “normative character” to it. The content of 
the duty to prevent transboundary harm has been articulated in treaty law, and this 
articulation has contributed to its CIL status.75 The duty has been articulated in two 
important declarations – the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration. 
Under Principle 21 from Stockholm:  
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.76  
 
72 Ibid, at 15. 
73 Ibid, at 22. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Overview of the Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International 
Pollution” in Daniel Barstow Magraw eds, International Law and Pollution (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 1991) at 64 [hereinafter Dupuy (1991)].  
76 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, at Principle 21 





Principle 21 was reproduced almost verbatim in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.77 
Together, both declarations have exercised considerable influence on the development of 
international environmental law and have since been duplicated in multiple treaties.78 
This repetition of the principles in the text of numerous treaties provides an example of 
treaties contributing to the development of CIL.79 In addition, the repetition of Principles 
21 and 2 demonstrates their “normative character”. Large numbers of states have ratified 
the treaties mentioning these principles; the clearly believe that the duty of prevention 
results in a legal obligation.  
Although there are over 200 international agreements dealing with environmental 
matters, only a handful deal specifically with transboundary pollution.80 Article 192 of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea expresses the general requirement of 
prevention by affirming that “[s]tates have the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment.”81 Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses affirms the same duty in international freshwater.82 
Furthermore, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity lists the measures to ensure 
conservation and sustainable use of biological resources within states parties.83 Other 
multilateral environmental agreements have dealt with transboundary pollution directly: 
 
77 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992, A/Conf.151/26 (Vol.1) at Principle 
2 (hereinafter Rio Declaration] 
78 Kiss & Shelton, supra note 16 at 284;  
79 Sands, supra note 61 at 145.  
80 Merill, supra note 62, at 933. 
81 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,  10 December 1982, No. 31363 at Art 192 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994). 
82 United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 May 1997, 
No 52106 at Art 2 (entered into force 17 August 2014). 
83 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, No. 30619 (entered into force 29 December 1993) at 




the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourse and 
International Lakes, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity.84 As well, Article 8 of the Paris Agreement 
states that “Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss 
and damage associated with adverse effects of climate change.”85 While Article 8 does 
not form a binding requirement, it does recognize that states are aiming to reduce 
damages stemming from climate change, which resembles the duty of prevention. Since 
determining CIL is not a quantitative analysis, the volume of treaties does not determine 
custom. Thus, the relatively small number of environmental treaties addressing 
transboundary pollution and the duty to prevent is not an indication one way or the other 
of CIL status. Even though there may only be a limited number of treaties implementing 
the duty of prevention, this may still adequately establish state practice and opinio juris.  
As the next section highlights, while states recognize the duty to prevent, they 
sometimes cause environmental damage in other states’ boundaries. This reality has been 
dealt with by the ICJ. 
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c. ICJ case law 
 
The ICJ has issued five important decisions dealing specifically with the duty to 
prevent transboundary harm. In the ICJ’s first decision since Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration was adopted, a dispute arose between New Zealand and Australia 
against France concerning the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in the South Pacific 
by the French Government from 1966 to 1972.86 These cases are referred to as the 
Nuclear Test Cases I. The main issue in the case was whether the radioactive fallout from 
the nuclear testing was inconsistent with rules of international law.87 The court found 
that, since France intended to cease atmospheric testing in the South Pacific, the 
objectives of New Zealand’s applications had been accomplished and the dispute no 
longer existed.88 However, Principle 21 was addressed by both New Zealand and 
Australia, which may indicate opinio juris.89 For example, Australia argued that Principle 
21 addressed “the very center of the problem in the present case” and suggested it as a 
rule of CIL that prohibited atmospheric nuclear tests.90 It was further argued that “the 
traditional standards of state freedom to pursue activities which may affect them must 
undergo some restriction.”91 However, the added separate opinions of these cases 
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demonstrate how divided the judges were in their views on the legal status not to prevent 
transboundary harm.  
The majority opinion and the dissent of Judge Petrén and Judge Castro in 
Australia v. France came to completely different conclusion on the customary status of 
the duty of prevention. Judge Petrén claimed that the argument brought forth by Australia 
and New Zealand depended on the CIL that prohibited states from conducting 
atmospheric tests on nuclear weapons giving rise to radioactive fall-out on the territory of 
other states.92 However, he concluded there was no such rule of CIL due to lack of state 
practice, as it was not clear that a sufficient number of states manufacturing nuclear 
weapons refrained from carrying out atmospheric tests because they considered this to be 
prohibited under international law.93 On the other hand, Judge Castro took a different 
approach in his dissenting opinion.94 He noted that Australia’s complaint against France 
was “based on a legal interest which has been well known since the time of Roman law,” 
namely the sic utere principle. He pointed that it is a feature of modern law that the 
owner of a property is liable for smoke and smells that overstep the physical limits of 
their property, and referred both to Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel.95 Therefore, Judge 
Castro believed that France should cease the deposit of the radioactive fall-out upon other 
territories.96 These differing opinions illustrate Brownlie’s differing judicial approaches 
to interpreting CIL. Judge Petrén took a strict interpretation to finding opinio juris, as the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration that established Principle 21 had not been in existence long 
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enough to discern CIL. On the other hand, Judge Castro took a more liberal 
interpretation, stating that the principle was applied in prior case law and stems from a 
general principle of property law (sic utere).  
In 1995, the Nuclear Tests II was submitted to the ICJ when France decided to 
carry out a series of underground nuclear tests in the South Pacific. In response, New 
Zealand attempted to reactivate the proceedings from 1974.97 The question before the ICJ 
was whether these new tests violated New Zealand’s rights under international law and 
whether it was unlawful for France to undertake tests without conducting an 
environmental impact assessment.98 The court concluded that since France was dealing 
with underground tests and the 1974 case concerned atmospheric tests, the court would 
not take account of the arguments derived by New Zealand to reactivate the case.99 
However, in obiter dictum, the court stated the present order was “without prejudice to 
the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural environment, obligations to 
which both New Zealand and France have in the present instance reaffirmed their 
commitment.”100 This “obligation of States” indicates that the court recognized the 
obligation to protect the natural environment as CIL. In the case, New Zealand argued 
that the duty to prevent transboundary harm was a “well established principle of 
customary international law”,101 and France recognized that a general obligation to 
protect the environment existed.102 In the decision, Judge Weeramantry stated that “no 
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nation is entitled by its own activities to cause damage to the environment of any other 
nation” and that this was a rule of CIL.103 Also in dissent, Judge Kormoa stated that 
“under contemporary international law, there is probably a duty not to cause gross or 
serious damage which can reasonably be avoided, together with a duty not to permit the 
escape of dangerous substances.”104 Also in dissent, Judge Palmer did not address the 
principle’s legal status, but recognized that the “obvious and overwhelming trend of these 
developments from Stockholm and Rio has been to establish a comprehensive set of 
norms to protect the global environment.”105 Therefore, while the three dissenting judges 
did not officially establish the duty of prevention of transboundary harm as CIL, they 
nonetheless contributed to its development. 
In the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the ICJ dealt with the environmental impact of the use of nuclear weapons, 
asking whether “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance is permitted 
under international law.”106 In this case, the court recognized that the environment “is 
under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe.”107 
Furthermore, the environment “is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the 
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn.”108 
The court stated: “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to 
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the environment.”109 Moreover, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration was 
invoked.110 Although the court found that the use of nuclear weapons was not specifically 
prohibited by existing international law, it emphasized that international law did indicate 
“important environmental factors that are properly taken into account” during armed 
conflict.111 Regardless, the importance of this decision is that the duty of prevention was 
recognized as being part of the “corpus of international law relating to the environment”.  
 The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case provides additional support for the duty of 
prevention forming CIL. This case involved the construction of a barrage system on the 
River Danube affecting Hungary and Czechoslovakia.112 Hungary would eventually 
abandon a section of the project due to concerns for its natural environment.113 
Czechoslovakia began looking for alternative solutions. Among them was Variant C, 
which entailed a unilateral diversion of the river.114 In 1993, Slovakia, which was now an 
independent state, proceeded to dam the river, and the dispute was submitted to the 
ICJ.115 The court emphasized “the great significance that it attaches to respect for the 
environment.”116 The court recited the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons discussing the general obligation on states to ensure that their activities respect 
the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control being part of “the 
corpus of international law relating to the environment.”117 This indicates that the court 
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considered the general obligations referred to in the Advisory Opinion to have a 
customary status.118  
 Further cementing the duty of prevention’s status as CIL is Pulp Mills. This 
dispute arose when Uruguay authorized and started the construction of two pulp mills 
along the banks of the River Uruguay, which borders Argentina.119 In 1975, both 
countries entered a treaty regarding the River Uruguay. This treaty required a party that is 
undertaking potentially damaging activities to notify the other; importantly, this party 
could proceed only if the notified country had no objections.120 In 2006, Argentina filed 
an application to the ICJ instituting proceedings, where it expressed concerns that the 
mills posed “major risks of pollution of the river, deterioration in biodiversity, harmful 
effects on health and damage to fish stocks.”121 The ICJ repeated a statement from Corfu 
Channel that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used 
for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”122 The court ruled that there were 
substantive obligations to take all necessary measures to ensure the optimum utilization 
of the river and to prevent transboundary environmental damage.123 It was also stated that 
the duty of prevention, as a customary rule, had its origin in “the due diligence that is 
required of a State in its territory.”124 The court further pointed to the Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons that the obligation of states to use all means at their 
disposal to avoid environmentally damaging activities from causing harm to other states 
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was part of the “corpus of international environmental law”.125 Therefore, the Pulp Mills 
decision further solidifies the duty of prevention’s status as a CIL.  
It appears the ICJ was willing to infer an opinio juris from the general principle of 
protecting the environment that was reflected in international treaties. As indicated earlier 
in this essay, a decision by the ICJ is highly influential in determining the customary 
status of a usage.126 There is a clear line of international case law dealing with the duty of 
prevention and several international treaties and declarations. This long line of agreement 
at the international level indicates that the duty of prevention has become CIL. Still, 
another issue arises. Prior case law has not dealt with GHG emissions specifically and 
this must be addressed to determine whether the duty of prevention can apply within the 
context of climate change. 
4. The Operation of the Duty 
 
To determine whether the duty to prevent transboundary harm applies to climate 
change, the contours of the duty must be understood. To understand these contours, it 
must be asked what a state is required to do to prevent the duty of transboundary harm. 
This main question relates to the standard of care applicable to the obligation of states to 
ensure activities within their jurisdiction do not cause cross-boundary damages.127 This 
essay will argue that states have a due diligence standard of care when preventing 
significant transboundary damage. Furthermore, this essay will analyze the ILC 
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Prevention Articles to determine what level of risk is needed before a state is required to 
act.  
a. Due diligence 
 
The most coherent interpretation of the standard of care for the duty of prevention 
is a due diligence obligation. The due diligence obligation is stated directly in the ILC’s 
Prevention Articles. The ILC states, regarding transboundary harm from hazardous 
activities, that “the obligation of the State of origin to take preventive or minimization 
measures is one of due diligence.”128 The conclusion is suggested by the wording of the 
duty to prevent transboundary harm in Principle 21 and 2 as an obligation “to ensure” – a 
phrase that has often been used to suggest due diligence rather than strict liability.129 The 
OECD’s Environment Committee also identified a “custom-based rule of due diligence 
imposed on all states in order that activities carried out within their jurisdiction do not 
cause damage to the environment of other states.”130 A due diligence obligation means 
that the duty to prevent transboundary harm does not require that the state of origin’s 
intention be to injure.131 Instead, states must take all measures to control and restrain 
likely harmful activity that can reasonably be excepted.132 The duty does not impose an 
absolute duty to prevent harm, but rather requires each state to prohibit those activities 
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known to cause significant harm to the environment, such as mitigating harm form lawful 
activities that may harm the environment.133  
 The due diligence standard needs further clarification to understand what level of 
effort a state is expected to make in the context of climate change. Under the ILC 
Prevention Articles, a state is required to “take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”134 This 
requires the state of origin to exert its “best possible efforts” to avert or to minimize the 
risk.135 It follows that “due diligence is manifested in reasonable efforts by a State to 
inform itself of factual and legal components that relate foreseeability to contemplated 
procedure and to take appropriate measures, in timely fashion, to address them.”136 In the 
same sense, the ICJ in the Pulp Mills case considered that a state has the obligation “to 
use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its 
territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the 
environment of another State.”137 Therefore, it appears the state is required to use all 
“reasonable efforts” or “means at its disposal” to reduce the risk.  
 The criterion of “reasonableness” entails a considerable degree of uncertainty and 
it must be discerned what “reasonableness” requires in the context of preventing 
transboundary harm. Under the ILC Prevention Articles, states must do the “best they 
can” with the relevant technical standards, such as the “best available technology” and 
 
133 Kiss & Shelton, supra note 16 at 91. 
134 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford 
Scholarship Online: 2020) at 86 [hereinafter de Sadeleer]. 
135 Ibid. 
136 ILC Prevention Articles, supra note 128 at Art 3(7). 




“best environmental practices”.138 Furthermore, in the Trail Smelter case, it was accepted 
that a due diligence standard was to apply having regard to the capacity of Canada, via 
improving emissions control technologies to limit transboundary damage.139 The Trial 
Smelter case and the ILC Prevention Article suggest that these due diligence obligations 
may be imposed according to a state’s “capabilities”, which considers differences in their 
economic and technological development stages.140 Where a state has made a reasonable 
due diligence effort to prevent significant transboundary harm, it cannot be made 
responsible for harm that occurs nonetheless, but the state will still have to act to prevent 
further damages.141 This interpretation, that states must do the best they can within their 
capabilities, is consistent with the reasonableness criteria, as it cannot be expected a state 
will go above and beyond its “best possible efforts” to prevent the transboundary harm. 
b. The degree of risk  
 
Since it is established that a state must make a due diligence effort to reduce risk, 
a different issue arises when applying a state’s effort to the degree of risk. Not all 
transboundary harms are equal. Some carry a far greater risk than others. In this regard, 
the extent of the required diligence increases in proportion with the severity of the risk, 
meaning a higher standard of care applies to activities which may be considered more 
hazardous than average.142 It is stated in the ILC Prevention Articles that “the standard of 
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due diligence is that which is generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to 
the degree of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance.”143 In other words, the 
regulation that must be implemented is circumstantial, with a higher level due diligence 
required as the risk increases.144 
There have been three different interpretations on how to evaluate the level of risk 
required in order to compel a state to make a due diligence effort. Under Article 3 of the 
ILC Prevention Articles, “the State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to 
prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”145 
Two of these interpretations are done by the ILC: according to Gunter Handl, this divides 
situations into events involving “significant transboundary harm”, which states are 
required to “prevent”, and those where States must “minimize the risk thereof”.146 
Therefore, the two threshold factors are “significant transboundary harm” and “risk 
thereof”. The third interpretation is done by a number of academics, which is the de 
minimis threshold.147 This paper argues in favour adopting the de minimis threshold, 
which provides a much lower threshold to compel states to take action prevent 
transboundary harm.  
The “significant transboundary risk” threshold, while sounding simple, is actually 
quite convoluted. Article 2(a) of the ILC Prevention Articles clarifies the threshold proof 
of “significant transboundary harm” as including risk both of a “high probability of 
causing significant transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous 
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transboundary harm.”148 When determining the scope of the obligation to prevent the 
occurrence of “significant transboundary harm”, it is necessary to take account of the 
combined effect of the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of its injurious 
impact.149 Therefore, the “significant transboundary harm” threshold appears be capable 
of incorporating climate change, since it takes into account the combined effect of all the 
potential consequences. Regardless, the de minimis approach provides far greater clarity 
as to when a state is required to act.  
The ILC Prevention Articles does not provide an explanation as to what a “risk 
thereof” entails. However, Handl claims a “risk thereof” means a “mere risk of 
significant transboundary harm.”150 Under this interpretation, a state is only obligated to 
minimize the transboundary harm.151 This has caused some confusion as to what a state 
ought to do to minimize the “risk thereof”. 
According to Handl, the ILC’s approach is problematic when it differentiates 
between certain harm (to be prevented) and less than certain harm (to be minimized).152 
This differentiation is based on the probability of the harm alone rather than on the 
composite of probabilities and consequences of the future event.153 In this normative 
scheme, a ‘mere’ risk of significant transboundary harm does not attract an obligation of 
prevention.154 Handl asserts that uncertain future harm, no matter how potentially 
catastrophic its nature and scope, does not eo ipso attract a legal obligation to end the risk 
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bearing activity.155 As a result, the ILC’s interpretation of the duty of prevention does not 
amount to CIL.  
A different approach to analyzing whether a “significant transboundary risk” 
occurs is by requiring a lower threshold. Several scholars have called for a de minimis 
burden of proof, meaning that, if the harm is not minor, the threshold is crossed.156 This 
approach can be read consistently with the ILC Prevention Articles, as the commentaries 
define “significant” as something more than “detectable”, which need not reach the level 
of “serious” or “substantial.”157 In other words, the harm must entail real detrimental 
effects in areas such as human health, industry, poverty, environment, etc.158 
Emphasizing a de minimis approach will lead to few problems in finding that GHG 
emissions cross the burden of proof threshold because it is much clearer than the ILC’s 
interpretation, which will compel states to act in the context of mitigating the harms done 
by climate change.  
5. The Duty in The Context of Climate Change 
 
As the case law from the ICJ has demonstrated, the duty on states to prevent 
transboundary harm is recognized as CIL. However, these cases, for the most part, dealt 
with singular instances of harm. For example, in Trail Smelter, the case concerned a 
single factory in Canada, pollutants from which flowed across the border. In the 1949 
Corfu Channel case, Albania was held responsible for specific damages to British 
warships and the death of 44 people in the North Corfu Strait.159 In addition, Pulp Mills 
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and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros deal with specific, identifiable instances of harm caused by 
damage to waterways. The facts of these cases are different from the harm caused by 
GHG emissions, especially considering that emissions are produced by virtually every 
aspect of the economy. While the Nuclear Tests Cases dealt with the accumulation of 
atmospheric pollution, ultimately the victim state was unsuccessful in its claim.  
The question that arises from these cases is whether the duty of prevention can be 
applied in the context of climate change. This paper argues that it can. The Advisory 
Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons provides a useful analogy to GHG 
emissions. What is relevant is not the quantity of emission by a state in a single year, but 
its emission over decades because of inadequate policy decisions by national 
governments over time.160  
Many scholars arguing against the duty of prevention being applied to climate 
change misunderstand the functionality of the actual duty. Its purpose is not to eliminate 
all harmful GHG emissions, but to balance the duty not to cause transboundary harm with 
the State’s right to develop its economy.161 When seen through this perspective, it 
becomes clear that the duty is not all-or-nothing. Since it will be impossible to 
completely eliminate emissions at the present moment, states will still be granted the 
right to continue emitting harmful substances to develop their economies. Instead, the 
duty to prevent transboundary harm obliges states to slowly eliminate their emissions. 
a. Climate Change and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Case 
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Before analyzing whether the duty of prevention applies in the context of GHG 
emissions, the consequences of climate change should be summarized. The ability of one 
state to significantly impact the territory of another should not be underestimated. 
Economically, although the “[g]lobal economic impacts from climate change are difficult 
to estimate,” the International Panel on Climate Change suggested that an increase of the 
global average temperature by 2°C would cause global annual economic losses at a 
minimum between 0.2 and 2.0% of global incomes.162 Stemming from the increase in 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, climate change has adversely 
impacted food security, affected terrestrial ecosystems, and contributed to desertification 
and land degradation in many regions.163 As the majority in the SCC noted in the 
landmark GPPAA Reference:  
Canada is also expected to continue to be affected by extreme weather events like 
floods and forest fires, changes in precipitation levels, degradation of soil and 
water resources, increased frequency and severity of heat waves, sea level rise, 
and the spread of potentially life-threatening vector-borne diseases like Lyme 
disease and West Nile virus.164  
 
The impacts of climate change are already having a massive toll on human life. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that climate change is currently causing the 
deaths of 150,000 people worldwide each year, and this is expected to increase to 
250,000-300,000 between 2030 and 2050.165 What this suggests is that emitting GHG 
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emissions is incredibly destructive, and that, in some respects, it does not matter where 
the emissions come from, because it GHG emissions collectively impact the entire world.  
Florentina Simlinger and Benoit Mayer argue that climate change differs from the 
previously mentioned cases in at least three pivotal ways.166 First, damages from climate 
change result not from a single act of a state but stem from states’ longstanding reliance 
on fossil fuels.167 Second, damages from climate change occur as a result of the 
concomitant conduct of multiple states, with the resulting harm not confined to a single 
state but affecting virtually all states.168 Finally, the harm results not from one particular 
activity, but from an accumulation of many activities over decades.169 These three 
reasons create difficulties when applying the duty to prevent transboundary harm to 
climate change.  
 The Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case represents an important 
analogy in the context of climate change. As Simlinger and Mayer indicate, some states 
in their submissions (Mexico, Egypt, and Ecuador) argued that the possibility of repeated 
use of nuclear weapons could cause a “nuclear winter” leading to a cataclysmic upheaval 
of the climate system, destroying most of earth’s life.170 According to Simlinger and 
Mayer, when mentioning that the damages caused by nuclear weapons could not “be 
contained in either space or time” and had “the potential to destroy all civilization and the 
entire ecosystem of the planet,”171 the ICJ made no distinction between immediate 
damage and damage caused by cumulative causation.172 In doing so, the court implied 
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that duty of prevention applied equally to both.173 These facts are analogous to GHG 
emissions. If two states launch nuclear weapons at each other continuously in a short 
period of time, the consequences are the devastation of our planet’s environment. States 
which have no part in the conflict will still suffer significantly. Similarly, if multiple large 
emitting states continuously emit GHGs over a long period of time, the result has the 
potential to be equally globally devastating.174 Furthermore, small developing countries, 
where emissions are relatively low, will be innocent bystanders.175 Additionally, the 
differences in the immediacy between a nuclear war and the slower nature of climate 
change should not be a deciding factor since the ultimate consequences are potentially the 
same. Consistent with the ILC Prevention Articles, the focus ought to be on the 
significance of the risk. The duration of how the risk unfolds is irrelevant to a state’s duty 
to prevent transboundary harm.  
Importantly, the ILC Prevention Articles do not explicitly mention GHG 
emissions as an example. The ILC Prevention Articles simply summarize the multilateral 
treaties in which the duty to prevent transboundary harm has already been agreed, 
including treaties addressing nuclear accidents, space objects, international watercourses, 
management of hazardous wastes and prevention of marine pollution.176 It should be 
noted that the ILC Prevention Articles were written in 2001, before states agreed under 
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Article 8 of the Paris Agreement to “recognize the importance of averting, minimizing 
and addressing loss and damage associated with adverse effects of climate change.”177 
The exclusion of references to the duty of prevention principle in response to climate 
change in the ILC Prevention Articles does not undermine its application to the duty of 
prevention.178 As Mayer indicates, states that argue that this exclusion means GHG 
emissions are inapplicable to the duty are operating under a misunderstanding.179 This 
misunderstanding is the belief that the duty to prevent transboundary harm requires a 
state to completely eliminate the harmful activity all together.  
It is often assumed that including GHG emissions into the duty of preventing 
transboundary harm would create unrealistic objectives, such as industrialized states 
forced to cover all of the expenses that could be attributed to the adverse impacts of 
climate change, or an absolute cessation of a given activity.180 However, in Trail Smelter 
it was stated:  
It would not be to the advantage of the two countries concerned that industrial 
effort should be prevented by exaggerating the interests of the agricultural 
community. Equally, it would not be to the advantage of the two counties that the 
agricultural community should be oppressed to advance the interest of industry.181  
 
The duty of prevention does not create an absolute duty of cessation, which would have 
been impossible to fulfill, or at least, impossible to impose on the parties in Trail 
Smelter.182 Rather, It is about the balancing of interests in a sustainable manner. Under 
this balancing act, and as this essay will demonstrate next, the principle of sovereignty 
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remains important to a state’s right to develop. In the context of the duty of prevention 
for climate change, a state’s right to emit in order to develop must be balanced with 
preventing or minimizing the consequences of these emissions. 
b. Sovereignty 
 
The principle of a state’s sovereignty over its natural resources is applicable to the 
duty to prevent harm. Sovereignty allows for states to conduct activities that utilize the 
natural resources within their territories, even when these activities adversely impact the 
environment.183 This is rooted in the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources formulated in various UN resolutions since 1952.184 For example, the UN 
General Assembly in 1962 adopted a landmark resolution that the “rights of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development of the well-being of the state 
concerned.”185 This reflects a state’s right to permanent sovereignty over its natural 
resources as an international legal right under international law. This right is also 
reflected in a number of environmental treaties. For example, the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention reaffirmed “the principle of sovereignty of states in international co-operation 
to address climate change.”186 Additionally, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
reaffirmed that states have “sovereign rights … over their natural resources” and that “the 
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authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with national governments and is 
subject to national legislation.”187 The Paris Agreement even adds that the framework 
will be “respectful of state sovereignty.”188 This obligation results from the requirement 
of peaceful co-existence between states’ interests, but neither the principle of sovereignty 
nor the principle to prevent transboundary harm is absolute.189   
Important to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, states are still free to extract 
their resources within their borders. This includes activities that cause the release of GHG 
emissions. Yet, the duty implies a compromise between the territorial sovereignty of the 
state of origin and the territorial integrity of the state likely to be affected by the harm.190 
The compromise under the duty of prevention clearly favours territorial integrity over 
territorial sovereignty.191 Since the contemporary international legal system is based on 
states being equal sovereigns, states could not be equal if one state was permitted to 
seriously interfere with the internal affairs of another.192 For example, one state could not 
be an equal sovereign with another if it was permitted to render the territory of another 
uninhabitable through causing environmental harms that cross international borders.193 
However, the concept of sovereignty means states are not obligated to eliminate every 
source of harmful activity. 
With this balancing act between the sovereign right to develop resources and the 
duty of prevention, states are allowed to continue their emitting activities while taking the 
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necessary steps to prevent or minimize the future harms of climate change. This should 
be clear evidence that the duty of prevention applies to GHG emissions; a state will still 
be allowed to continue emitting as long as active steps are taken to reduce these emitting 
sources. Furthermore, when evaluating whether the duty of prevention applies to climate 
change, there is a clear development of ICJ case law beginning with the Nuclear Test 
Cases and the assertion by the ICJ that the duty to prevent consequences of nuclear 
weapons is CIL. This analogy applies directly to the context of climate change, as the 
consequences are similar. Since the ICJ has clearly labelled the duty of prevention as 
CIL, and the duty applies in the context of climate change, the question then becomes 




6. Customary Law and the Duty of Prevention in Canada 
Canada, as a wealthy industrialized country, has long contributed more to the 
climate change problem by emitting more GHG emissions compared to other states. In 
fact, Canada ranks seventh in the world in per capita emissions.194 Therefore, Canada has 
considerable responsibility to reduce its emissions to prevent transboundary harm. How is 
Canada meeting this responsibility? This essay argues that a carbon pricing system, 
which Canada has adopted under the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, is the most 
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effective way to prevent transboundary harm. But first, it must be established how CIL 
applies to Canada. 
a. Canada’s adoption of CIL 
 International law is incorporated into domestic law in two ways: the (1) monist 
approach and (2) the dualist approach.195 The dualist method requires an international 
law to be expressly received (or transformed) by some executive and/or legislative 
action.196 When it comes to treaties, Canada is a dualist state.197 Thus, the only way 
treaties become binding in Canada as a matter of domestic law is when they are 
transformed through domestic legislation. Under the monist approach, international law is 
directly incorporated into domestic law and is immediately effective without additional 
legislative or executive action.198 While Canada does not follow the monist approach for 
treaties, it does for CIL. In Canada, CIL is directly incorporated into the common law of 
Canada and is effective immediately unless displaced by legislation.199 This is known as 
the doctrine of incorporation (or adoption).200 Canada does not follow a purely monist 
approach with respect to CIL; however, it follows a modified monist approach to 
incorporating CIL because the CIL is only directly applicable in Canada (flowing into 
common law) as long as it is not displaced by legislation. If there is any legislation that 
contradicts the CIL, then this legislation displaces the CIL common law.  
 









 There is considerable authority for the proposition that Canada follows a modified 
monist approach to CIL.201 Beginning in 1953, in Re Foreign Legations, the court 
considered the power of Ontario municipal corporations to levy taxes for municipal 
purposes against buildings housing legations owned by several foreign states in the 
national capital region.202 Chief Justice Duff held that the legations could not be 
subjected to municipal taxation because “some general principles touching the position of 
the property of a foreign state and the minister of a foreign state have been accepted and 
adopted by the law of England (which, except as modified by statute, is the law of 
Ontario) as part of the law of nations.”203 This finding represents an application of the 
doctrine of incorporation, meaning Canada follows a particular CIL but can also modify 
“general principles” of law domestically.204  
More recently, modified monism for CIL was affirmed as part of Canadian law in 
R v. Hape, a landmark decision concerning the doctrine of incorporation. The case dealt 
with an investment banker convicted of money laundering.205 It involved RCMP officers 
working with authorities from Turks and Caicos to investigate the accused’s office on the 
Islands.206 The accused submitted that the evidence obtained was in violation of his 
section 8 Charter rights.207 While holding that the Charter cannot be enforced in another 
state’s territory without the other state’s consent, the SCC stated:  
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…following the common law tradition, it appears that the doctrine of adoption 
operates in Canada such that prohibitive rules of customary international law 
should be incorporated into domestic law in the absence of conflicting legislation. 
The automatic incorporation of such rules is justified on the basis that 
international custom, as the law of nations, is also the law of Canada unless, in a 
valid exercise of its sovereignty, Canada declares that its law is to the contrary. 
Absent an express derogation, the courts may look to prohibitive rules of 
customary international law to aid the interpretation of Canadian law and the 
development of the common law.208  
 
As clearly indicated, CIL is automatically adopted into Canadian law and can only be 
displaced by domestic legislation.209  
The 2020 Nevsun case involved three individuals who were conscripted to work 
in an Eritrean mine in which the majority was owned by the Canadian company 
Nevsun.210 The conditions in the mine were horrific, and claims were brought forth 
involving forced labour, slavery, cruel and inhumane treatment, and crimes against 
humanity, which were said to be peremptory norms (jus cogens) from which no 
derogation is permitted.211 This case addressed only the threshold question of 
justiciability, not the precise content of the law to be applied. The question was whether it 
was plain and obvious that the claims would fail.212 Justice Abella’s majority affirmed 
that CIL is a part of Canadian common law, and a breach by a Canadian company of CIL 
can theoretically be remedied.213 The SCC ruled that the “automatic incorporation” of 
norms of CIL “is justified on the basis that international custom, as the law of nations, is 
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also the law of Canada.”214 Therefore, if the twin requirements of CIL (state practice and 
opinio juris) are met, CIL becomes fully integrated into Canadian domestic law.215 As 
further indicated in the decision, consistent with the modified monist approach, 
legislatures are of course free to change or override CIL; but like all common law, no 
legislative action is required to give CIL effect in Canada.216 As the case law 
demonstrates, since the duty of prevention has been recognized as CIL, the duty 
automatically applies to Canadian domestic law. This is consistent with the doctrine of 
incorporation. Applying modified monism to the focus of this paper, unless displaced by 
domestic legislation, Canada has an obligation to abide by the CIL norm to prevent 
transboundary harm. 
b. The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 
 
 The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA) was enacted and came into 
force in 2018.217 The key purpose of the GGPPA is to create incentives for the 
behavioural changes necessary to reduce GHG emissions.218 To achieve this purpose, 
carbon pricing policies are applied broadly throughout the provinces.219 The Act has two 
key parts. Part 1 of the legislation is the fuel charge, which is the price per tonne of the 
various GHGs emitted, while Part 2 is the Output Based Pricing Mechanisms, or a cap-
and-trade.220 For Part 1, the price per tonne was set at $20 for 2019, and will rise to $50 
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per tonne by 2022, with a loose goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.221 In 
December 2020, Prime Minister Trudeau announced a price increase to $170 per tonne 
before 2030.222 The charges are paid by producers, distributors, and importers of fuel; it 
is expected the costs will be passed on to consumers.223 For example, the result of the 
charge increased the price of gasoline by 4.43 cents per litre in 2019, and will rise 
annually until it reaches 11.05 cents per liter in 2022 above what it would have been 
without the charge.224 This charge is what is widely regarded as the “carbon tax”. Yet, 
this charge is revenue neutral and 90 percent of the proceeds are to be returned to the 
individuals within a jurisdiction in the form of a Climate Action Incentive Payment, 
while the remaining 10 percent is given for reduction investments to small businesses and 
institutions through the Climate Action Incentive Fund.225  
Part 2 of the GGPPA allows large emitters to opt out of the fuel charge and enter 
the Output-Based Pricing System (OBPS), which is a cap-and-trade program.226 Facilities 
covered by the program provide compensation for the portion of emitted GHGs that 
exceed their applicable emissions limit based on sector specific percentages.227 Industries 
that emit below their cap receive a credit, while facilities that exceed their limit must pay 
a charge to the federal government.228 Most industries have the standard set at 80 percent 
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of the sector’s average GHG emission intensity, meaning that an industry must emit more 
than 20 percent less than the average to receive a credit.229 The GGPPA allows for a 
market to buy and sell these credits.230 The combination of a carbon levy and the cap-
and-trade system is what is referred to as “carbon pricing”.  
 By implementing a carbon price, Canada is meeting its due diligence obligations 
under the duty of prevention. As a result, Canada is meeting its duties under CIL. As 
previously discussed, states have an obligation to make their “best efforts” to prevent 
foreseeable significant damage, or at least minimize the risk of harm. Experts have 
frequently argued that carbon pricing is the most effective tool for reducing emissions; 
hence, a carbon price must be a state’s “best efforts”. For example, the Federal-
Provincial-Territorial Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms, which was created 
by the federal government to determine the effectiveness of carbon pricing, claimed 
“[m]any experts regard carbon pricing as a necessary policy tool for efficiently reducing 
GHG emissions.”231 Furthermore, the High Level Commission on Carbon, comprised of 
economists and climate change scientists from around the world, reported that a well 
designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for reducing emissions in an 
efficient way.232 Joseph Stiglitz, an American Nobel winning economist, advocates for a 
detailed carbon price to apply to all sectors of the economy, albeit not with a “single 
price” applied uniformly.233 This is consistent with how the Canadian carbon price was 
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designed, as certain exemptions are carved out for large emitters that may opt out of the 
carbon price and enter the Output-Based Pricing System (OBPS), a cap-and-trade 
program.234 Therefore, by implementing a carbon-pricing, Canada is doing its “best 
effort” due diligence to reduce its emissions. It also should be noted that while a carbon 
price is one way for a particular country to meet its CIL, there are a number of other ways 
(such as command and control regulation), for a country to abide by the duty of 
prevention  
 Around the globe, a large number of industrialized wealthy countries have begun 
implementing carbon pricing strategies. For example, in Europe, eighteen countries have 
implemented a carbon tax.235 The price ranges from less than €1 per metric ton of carbon 
emissions in Poland and Ukraine to more than €100 in Sweden.236 In July 2021, the EU 
proposed a new legislation that would impose a carbon price on imported goods.237 While 
this policy has yet to be implemented, it will be the first of its kind, and will aim to 
protect domestic industries that are abiding by EU’s emission reduction policies.238 As 
estimated by the World Bank, approximately 40 countries around the world have 
implemented a carbon pricing mechanism.239 With a few exceptions, these carbon prices 
have all been implemented in wealthy industrialized countries. This indicates that 
wealthy industrialized states, which have contributed more to the problem, have a 
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heightened ability to implement more stringent policies to prevent transboundary harm. 
This heightened ability may come in the form of a carbon price.  
 Considering only a large portion of countries have not implemented a carbon 
price, how can there be an opinio juris compelling a state to prevent the transboundary 
harm of GHG emissions through the implementation of a carbon pricing mechanism? The 
answer to this is that it is unnecessary for all states to take similar measures against 
foreseen consequences because due diligence obligations may be imposed according to 
“their capabilities”.240 This due diligence approach is consistent with the “common but 
differentiated capabilities” (CBDR) principle, which recognizes that developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility they bear and may have an additional responsibility based 
on their enhanced capabilities.241 Notably, CBDR has not reached customary status, but it 
still provides some “steering” effect on state behaviour.242 CBDR considers states’ socio-
economic differences when goals and benchmarks are applied to global development 
agendas.243 Therefore, when analyzing the level of due diligence involved, it is important 
to consider a state’s capacity. Canada has not only contributed more to the problem of 
GHG emissions, but has more resources than developing states to reduce its emissions.244 
As a wealthy industrialized economy, Canada has a heightened ability to prevent 
transboundary pollution, while also allowing for its sovereign right to develop. It should 
be stressed that, for Canada, a greater emphasis is placed on its duty of prevention 
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compared to a developing state. Under this approach, Canada has an increased obligation 
to prevent transboundary harm, and it is in this light that the GGPPA and subsequent 
litigation, carbon taxes and carbon pricing should be considered.  
c. The Greenhouse Gas Pricing Pollution Act Reference  
 
In March 2020, the SCC delivered a landmark decision known as the Re 
Greenhouse Gas Pricing Pollution. The case primarily dealt with the constitutionality of 
the GGPPA. Wagner C.J, writing for the majority, recognized that the presence of the 
Paris Agreement was a factor influencing the decision to uphold the GGPPA.245 He did 
not reference the CIL duty to prevent transboundary harm, although - as established 
earlier – this also should be a factor under consideration. Even though Canada’s 
obligations under the Paris Agreement were not decisive factors, Wagner C.J. recognized 
that “[a]ddressing climate change requires collective national and international action. 
This is because the harmful effects of GHGs are by their very nature not confined within 
borders.”246 Again, while the SCC did not consider CIL, this statement reflects the need 
for states to prevent transboundary harm to other states. In upholding the GGPPA, 
Wagner C.J recognized that collective action is needed by Canada and acknowledged that 
harm that crosses borders ought to be prevented, including through a carbon tax.  
Taking the inverse approach, if the GGPPA was held to be unconstitutional, and 
the nation-wide carbon pricing scheme was abolished, would Canada be abiding by the 
CIL duty of prevention? Since Canada is a federalist state, the provinces have a great deal 
of discretion in establishing their own climate policies. Before the GGPPA became law, 
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only British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario had carbon pricing mechanisms.247 In 
addition, Canada was seriously behind in meeting its Paris Agreement GHG emission 
reduction targets: Canada’s overall emissions had only decreased by 3.8 percent from 
2005 to 2016, far short of the Paris Agreement goals of a 30 percent reduction by 
2030.248 This trajectory virtually guaranteed that Canada would not meet its international 
Paris Agreement commitment. Moreover, this trajectory also demonstrated that Canada 
was very likely also failing to fulfill the CIL duty to prevent transboundary harm.  
Besides the GGPPA, there are no other federal legislation tackling climate 
change, with one exception: the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act. This 
legislation enshrines Canada’s commitment to set national targets for the reduction of 
GHG emissions with the objective of attaining net-zero emissions by 2050.249 The Net-
Zero Act requires an emissions reduction plan, a progress report, and an assessment 
report for Canada’s targets.250 The Net-Zero Act also sets the 2030 GHG emission 
reduction target as more ambitious than what Canada has committed to under the Paris 
Agreement. This target is set at between 40 and 45 percent below 2005 levels.251 The Net-
Zero Act demonstrates that Canada is committed to reducing its emissions; but, unlike the 
GGPPA, there is nothing setting out how the commitment will be fulfilled. It is more of a 
commitment to commit, meaning Canada is creating a law to reduce its emissions, but 
how this will be done is dealt with by other legislation. This other legislation is the 
GGPPA. Without the GGPPA, Canada cannot abide by the CIL duty to prevent 
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transboundary harm with the Net-Zero Act alone. More is needed for Canada to make its 
due diligent and “best effort” to prevent the transboundary flow of GHG emissions.  
7. Conclusion 
 
 The duty to prevent transboundary harm is a CIL. It was established in Trail 
Smelter and has been consistently repeated in treaties subsequent to the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration. In addition, the ICJ has explicitly stated it is CIL, thereby recognizing the 
combination of state practice and opinio juris. As a result, all states – including Canada - 
are bound by the obligation to make a due diligence effort to reduce transboundary 
harms. This due diligence effort is based on a state’s capabilities. In other words, this due 
diligence effort must be reasonable. 
The fact that states continue to pollute does not negate the duty’s CIL status: the 
discussion in the ICJ case law has illustrated that states accept and feel bound by the duty 
to prevent transboundary harm, even if they choose to violate that duty. GHG emissions 
represent a form of transboundary harm that is covered under the CIL duty to prevent 
transboundary harm. 
The consequences of climate change are potentially catastrophic, and are no 
longer remote.252 In 2021, heat waves ravaged Western North America and caused 
massive forest fires, large parts of Germany and Belgium suffered from unexpected 
flooding, and stronger than normal monsoons devasted parts of India, triggering 
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landslides.253 Events such as these will only increase in the future.254  Since GHG 
emissions flow transboundary, states are obligated to reduce their emissions to prevent 
such harms from happening.  
 Canada is bound by the customary duty to prevent transboundary harm. Since 
Canada follows a modified monist approach, Canada is bound by any CIL that is not 
displaced by legislation. To date, legislation has not displaced the prevention duty. In 
fact, the GGPPA reiterates this duty. The nation-wide carbon pricing scheme established 
by the GGPPA is consistent with the implementation of the CIL duty to prevent 
transboundary harm. The adoption of the GGPPA demonstrates that Canada is taking 
legislative action to implement its CIL duty, using its due diligent “best efforts” to reduce 
emissions through a carbon price. The GGPPA does not require an absolute cessation of 
emissions. Some industries – particularly those involved in creating GHG emissions - 
will feel its impact more than others, but this fact does not affect or negate Canada’s 
overarching obligation to prevent transboundary harm.  
 Canada has made clear international commitments to reduce emissions under the 
Paris Agreement. Canada has an additional, simultaneous, duty under CIL to do so. 
While the Paris Agreement quantifies the actual reduction target Canada must meet under 
international law, the duty to prevent transboundary harm places a concomitant 
commitment on Canada to prevent the harm from occurring. The GGPPA helps to 
address both the treaty and CIL obligations. The projections are that the prices associated 
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with the per tonne of GHG emissions will lead to GHG emission reductions that exceed 
Canada’s commitments and will, therefore, also assist Canada in meeting the due 
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